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Abstract 
 
As humanity is moving into a new age of its demographic evolution, I call 
it  demographic  maturity,  the  emerging  demographic  configurations  – 
generational  sub-replacement  fertility,  advanced  aging  and  potential 
population implosion – call  for new ways of  thinking about  population 
and new policy approaches. While we live longer and healthier, we also 
reproduce less and less. We are stuck in a culture of low fertility. The 
strong motivations for foregoing motherhood are financial: a two-salary 
wage  is  better  than  one  even  for  the  higher  middle  class.  No  less 
important  is  the  woman’s  financial  independence  in  a  societal 
environment  where  marriage  as  an  institution  is  under  considerable 
stress. Motherhood is to be rewarded adequately for its highly important 
social role and it has to be sufficient to reassure potential mothers of their 
financial  concerns.  What  is  required  is  a  more  balanced  resource 
allocation  between  production  and  reproduction.  The  old  welfare  type 
hand-outs like child bonuses do not work. Societies, particularly the rich, 
ought to realize that to raise fertility, even to generational replacement 
level, not only is a much greater financial effort called for but some of the 
tenants of the liberal economy need to be put into question to make room 
for social concerns such a renewal of generations, if they want   to survive 
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as national entities. This essay advocates a stationary population as the 
best response to challenges such as ecological health, national identity 
and cohesion, and possibly world peace.  
 
Key  Words: D e m o g r a p h i c  m a t u r i t y ,  l o w  f e r t i l i t y  c u l t u r e ,  p r o d u c t i o n  
versus reproduction, stationary population 
 
 
 
Résumé 
 
À une époque où l’humanité avance vers une nouvelle ère de son évolution 
démographique,  ce  que  j’appelle  l’ère  de  maturité d é m o gr a p h i q u e ,  l e s 
configurations démographiques émergeantes – le taux de fécondité sous le 
seuil de remplacement, le vieillissement avancé, et l’implosion potentielle 
de la population – nous requièrent de trouver de nouvelles manières de 
penser en matière de population ainsi que de nouvelles approches dans 
l’élaboration  des  polices.  Bien  que  nous  vivions  plus  longtemps  et  en 
meilleure santé, nous nous reproduisons aussi de moins en moins. Nous 
sommes enlisés dans une culture de basse fécondité. Les motivateurs qui 
ont le plus d’impact sur la reproduction sont financiers:  un salaire biactif 
est  préférable  à  un  salaire  unique  pour  la  classe  moyenne  élevée. 
L'indépendance financière des femmes dans un environnement social où le 
mariage est une institution en danger est aussi importante. La maternité 
devrait  être  adéquatement  récompensée  pour  l'importance  de  son  rôle 
social et cela devrait être suffisant pour rassurer les mères en puissance 
au sujet de leurs préoccupations financières. Une allocation de ressources 
mieux équilibrée entre production et reproduction est nécessaire. Le bien-
être  social  de  charité  d’autrefois,  tel  que  les  allocations  familiales,  ne 
fonctionnent  pas.    Les  sociétés,  particulièrement  les  riches,  devrait 
réaliser que pour rehausser le  taux de fécondité, même  simplement au 
seuil de remplacement générationnel, ne requiert pas seulement un plus 
grand  effort  financier  mais  aussi  que  certaines  des  doctrines  de 
l’économie  libérale  soient  remises  en  question  pour  faire  place  à  des 
préoccupations sociales  telles que le renouvellement générationnel,  s’il 
compte survivre en tant qu'entité nationale. Cette thèse prône un système 
de  population  stationnaire  comme  étant  la  meilleure  solution  pour  les 
défis  modernes  tels  que  la  santé  écologique,  l'identité  et  la  cohésion 
nationale, et possiblement la paix dans le monde. 
 
Mots-clés: Maturité démographique, culture à basse fécondité, production 
contre reproduction, population stationnaire 
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Introduction 
 
We are often so absorbed by our own research, mostly narrow in scope, 
that we don’t see the big picture. It is good to take a breath once and a 
while - sit back, and reflect precisely on the bigger picture. What is it? 
Where  do  we  stand  in  the  demographic  evolution?  Where  are  we 
heading? I would like to reflect on the current low fertility regime in the 
broader context of contemporary demography. It should made clear right 
from the outset that this paper does not claim the status of a full-fledged 
research  article  with  all  its  cannons  being  met.  This  is  an  essay,  a 
discussion paper. 
Specifically, this essay is geared towards the following three broad 
topics:  
 
•        first, demographic maturity as an emerging new era in the 
demographic evolution of humanity; 
 
•        second, stationary population as an optimum solution for 
some  of  the  major  problems  faced  by  humanity,  not  the 
least  of  which  are  ecological  stresses,  fertility  versus 
immigration options, national identity;  
 
•        third, reassessing the childbearing public support by shifting 
the  debate  from  the  prevailing  welfare f r a m e w o r k  t o  a  
broader  framework  of  resources  allocation  between 
production and reproduction. 
 
I  chose  these  topics  because  I  felt  they  are  important  for  the 
understanding  of  what  is  going  on  at  the  present  juncture  of  the 
demographic  evolution  and  what  it  takes  to  meet  the  emerging 
challenges. As contentious as these ideas are or may appear to be, and 
maybe for this reason, they stand, at least it is hoped, to incite us to get 
into population policy debates that are now by and large missing. One 
can  indeed  easily  anticipate  disagreement  with  my  stance  on  these 
matters. There is plenty of substance for arguing for and against it. 
 
 
Demographic Maturity:  A New Era in Demographic Evolution 
 
My  reading  of  events  in  contemporary  demographic  history  is  that 
humanity is entering a new era of demographic configuration. Western 
Europe is already there, many other countries are following suit and are 
even  overtaking  Europe  in  this  regard  (Japan,  Korea,  Taiwan).  Now, 
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what is this new era that in my view is so unique, so radically different 
from the one – demographic transition – we are leaving behind? I would 
argue  in  what  follows  that  humanity  is  entering  a  post-transitional, 
unprecedented era in population evolution with its two defining moments 
– one related to health and longevity; the other to procreation. While we 
as  individuals  live  longer,  we  reproduce  ourselves  less  and  less.  Our 
reproduction  levels  are  consistently  low,  below  the  generational 
replacement level. 
Not only do we live longer, but we are also healthier when we 
reach the upper level of our life span. The limits of survival are being 
slowly pushed upwardly. What are those limits can only be conjectured. 
But  there  is  no  doubt  that  further  gains  are  to  be  expected  due  to 
advances  in  medical  technology,  organ  transplantation  and  genetic 
engineering. Let's not overlook the very real benefits of a healthier life 
style  – a  b e t t e r  a n d  b a l a n c e d  d i e t ,  n o n -smoking  public  environment, 
physical activity. To be sure we have to be vigilant. The deadly scourge 
may just be below the surface, around the corner. The AIDS epidemic 
came out of nowhere or so it appears. But, while remaining circumspect 
we are entitled to be optimistic on the account of future prospects for 
longevity and quality of life. 
Yet,  at  the  same  time,  fertility  has  gone  down  dramatically.  In 
Western Europe total fertility rates are in the range of 1.5 to 1.8 births per 
woman, according to the most recent UN statistics (2008). Lower rates are 
observed in Southern Europe (Italy and Greece 1.3 and Spain 1.4). In most 
of  Eastern  Europe  countries  they  are  still  lower.  For  instance,  Poland, 
Ukraine,  Belarus and Slovakia post 1.2 births per woman;  the  Russian 
Federation  1.3;  Romania  1.3.  And  so  is  in  countries  of  Eastern  Asia: 
Japan,  1.3;  Korea  1.2  births  per  woman.  The  sub-replacement  fertility 
phenomenon is gaining momentum so much so that it  becomes global, 
spreading over to less  developed  countries. In most Muslim countries, 
with  all  their  traditionalist  and  conservative  reputation,  fertility  has 
plummeted to the replacement level. It is true in Tropical Africa. Many 
countries  there  still  withstand  the  trend.  The  Democratic  Republic  of 
Congo is at the same level of fertility as it was when I left it in 1961. But 
again, this is a matter of time, and fertility is already declining in some 
African countries, particularly in the South. There is nothing to bewail in 
this global downward fertility drift. One can only imagine, if high fertility 
was still dominant, what population explosion the world would be facing, 
with all  its possible deleterious consequences (e.g., ecological collapse, 
international conflicts over scarce resources, such as water). 
On the other hand, we need to be aware of sub-replacement fertility 
as an enduring feature of our demographic reality. The process could be 
irreversible. Population implosion, not as temporary occurrence, but as an 
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exponential trend, is well in the offing. This is already the case in Eastern 
Europe  and  in  some  Asian  countries  (Japan,  Korea).  Were  it  not  for 
massive immigration, that would by now be the case in Western and South 
Europe, and in Canada too. Sub-replacement fertility is thus becoming so 
prevalent  throughout  the  world  that  it  becomes  a  sui  generis t o p i c  o f  
interest  to  demographers.  They e v e n  w e n t  a s  f a r  a s  t o  c o n c o c t  n e w  
vocabulary  such  as  hyper  low f e r t i l i t y  o r  lowest-low  fertility  to 
differentiate from moderately low fertility. 
Yet,  for  some  students  in  population  what  is  occurring  now  is 
nothing really novel; rather they regard it as an extension, an amplification 
of the demographic transition we know. They call it second demographic 
transition,  referring  namely  to  changes  in  peoples’  matrimonial 
behaviours.  Associated  with  such  prominent  names  in  contemporary 
demography  as  Ron  Lesthaeghe  and  Dirk  van  de  Kaa,  the  second 
demographic transition theory has gained a wide acceptance indeed. My 
view is that we shall reserve the term “demographic transition” to that 
unique period in human history that was the shift from the traditional high 
vital rates  to the modern  low. It might be not irrelevant to remind  the 
reader that even before the events fully unravelled, the well known French 
demographer  of  an  earlier  generation,  Adolph  Landry,  spoke  of 
“révolution  démographique.”  And  it  was.  Still  others  call  this  new 
demographic era just post transitional stage, others post-modern without 
really  engaging  into  finding  out  what  does  it  really  imply,  theory  and 
policy-wise. For my part, I see it as a new age in population evolution, one 
I would like to dub the regime of demographic maturity. The matter is not 
just  that of semantic. The  matter is one of perception of what actually 
happens in global demography that sets upside down much of what we 
knew so far. And it also has far-reaching policy implications. The public 
choice  is  between  “laisse]  faire”  policy  and  one  involving  deliberate 
actions, call it interventionist, to either enhance or counter the unfolding 
trends depending on how they are being perceived from the stand point of 
public good. 
The term “demographic maturity” may make some people uneasy. 
Once maturity is reached, death follows inevitably. And that may be so. 
Not only individuals are mortal, but so are nations  and societies. The 
great  British  historian  Arnold  Toynbee  has  identified  23  or  more 
civilizations that have vanished from the earth in the history of mankind, 
the  latest  in  Europe  being  the  Roman  Empire.  And  how  many  more 
nations have actually disappeared? He didn’t count. For him the entity of 
historical  study  is  not  the  nation  but  civilization.  Yet,  my  vision  of 
demographic  maturity,   though  inspired  by  sociobiology,  has  a 
redeeming v i r t u e .  M a t u r i t y  d o e s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  m e a n  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  
world.  We  can  be  old  and  yet  enjoy  vitality,  as  individuals  and  as  a 
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nation.  A  nation’s  healthy m a t u r i t y  c a n  b e  m a i n t a i n e d  i n d e f i n i t e l y ,  
speaking  in  terms  of  historical  time.  It  can  be  maintained  by  a 
demographic policy that responds to the imperatives of self-reproduction, 
as we shall see later. A policy of demographic preservation through self-
reproduction is not only desirable; it is imperative for the survival of a 
demographically mature society, as a national entity.  
Everything  considered,  what  is  important  to  recognise  is  that 
humanity is moving into a new age of its demographic evolution, and that 
the emerging demographic configuration – generational sub-replacement 
fertility, advanced aging and potential population implosion – requires a 
new way of thinking about population and new policy approaches. And 
this  leads  me  to  the  second  topic  listed  at  the  beginning  of  this 
presentation. 
 
 
Stationary Population as a Policy Option 
 
Policy  response  to  sub-replacement  fertility  and  implied  population 
decline, actual or prospective, varies among nations. Western Europe and 
English  speaking  countries  have  opted  for  large-scale  immigration  in 
response both to the need to maintain population growth and to satisfy 
the  ever-growing  demand  for  a  labour  force  in  an  economy  bent  on 
growth and profit. The populationist instinct remains strong in some of 
these  countries,  most  notably  in  France  and  Canada.  In  Canada,  for 
example, both liberal and conservative governments pursue a policy of 
maintaining  the  population  growth  momentum  by  means  of  massive 
immigration.  Yet,  it  is  patently  clear  that  a  sustained  immigration  to 
maintain growth in a country that no longer reproduces itself is bound to 
seriously  affect  the  country’s  historical  national  identity.  By  contrast, 
Eastern  European  countries  – b o t h  t h o s e  o f  t h e  f o r m e r  S o v i e t  U n i o n  
(Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Baltic countries) and those now part of the 
Union of Europe (Poland, Rumania, Hungary) – remain antagonistic to 
any idea of immigration to compensate for population losses, with the 
exception  of  temporary  migration  from  eastern  countries,  particularly 
from Ukraine and Belarus. Asian Far Eastern countries, namely Japan 
and  Korea,  notwithstanding  the  significant  decline  in  population  that 
does not seem to slow down, have so far refrained from immigration in 
the  name  of  the  country’s  national  integrity.  Whatever  immigration 
intake  filtered  in  so  far  in  these  countries  it  is  highly  selective  and 
restrictive.  
The policy advocated herein is a policy aimed at achieving in the 
long run a stationary population with a self-reproductive capacity. This is 
by no means a novel concept: “It must always have been seen, more or 
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less distinctly, by political economists, that the increase of wealth is not 
boundless: that at the end of what they term the progressive state lays the 
stationary state..." These words were uttered more than one and a half 
centuries ago by the famous British thinker John Stuart Mill (1848, 1965: 
746). The concept has been resurrected since then under various guises, 
the most notable one by the proponents of the so-called “Zero Population 
Growth”  in the post-war years. It seems to me  that the advent of the 
demographic  maturity  regime,  along  with  social  and  technological 
developments  underway  world  wide  (but  more  so  in  economically 
advanced countries), warrant a fresh look at the idea of the stationary 
state. 
The virtue of a stationary population is that it avoids, on the one 
hand, the prospect of demographic saturation in a finite space with all its 
negative  ecological  and  political  attendants  and,  on  the  other,  the 
prospect of exponential population implosion and demographic attrition. 
While  population  growth  creates  its  share  of  problems,  protracted 
population  decline  is  not  a  desirable  prospect  either  for  reasons  of 
economic  and  national  security.  A  stationary  population  configuration 
best  addresses  current  concerns  such  as,  environmental,  demographic 
(i.e. low fertility and high immigration), and national identity and social 
cohesion. 
As of late, environmental concerns are in the forefront of public 
debates,  both  nationally  and  internationally.  In  highly  industrialized 
countries where per capita propensity for pollution is highest on account 
of both the population size and the levels of technology generating toxic 
waste, the problem is of the highest acuteness. Even with all the warning 
over the potential collapse of the ecosystem and world order, it would be 
naive to think that people will ever be less selfish or voracious in their 
consumption habits. Yet, if at least one key factor in the environmental 
equation – namely, population growth — can be brought under control, it 
would be in itself a giant step forward.  
A reduced and better targeted immigration policy would allow a 
more complete integration of immigrants into mainstream society, and 
insure  greater  social  cohesiveness,  thus  alleviating  the  legitimate 
concerns for potential social divisiveness and national identity. As David 
Coleman (2008) pointedly argues, migration has become a powerful new 
engine  of  demographic  and  social  change  in  the  Western  world. 
Demography is emerging as the driving force in redrawing the political, 
social and ethnic landscape nationally and potentially world wide. Yet it 
has to be clear that nations are not constructed instantly or artificially, 
and that social constructs divorced from human nature and history can be 
troublesome. 
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Hence, from whatever vantage point the question is approached, it 
is  fair  to  argue  that  stationary  population  stands  out  as  the  optimal 
solution to many of the fundamental problems humanity is facing.  
But is the project of a stationary population feasible, and how so 
specifically?  I  am  inclined  to  respond  affirmatively  to  the  question. 
Never in the modern history of human demographic evolution have the 
conditions for its realisation coalesced as much as in recent times. The 
movement  across international  boarders  of  know-how r a t h e r  t h a n  o f  
human  beings,  as  well  as  out- a n d  i n -sourcing  of  work  without  the 
physical displacement of peoples, are at least partly alternatives to the 
ever-growing  demand  for  workers.  So  is  also  the  increasing  use  of 
labour-saving  automation,  as  substitute  for  unskilled  workers,  in 
particular.  Not  overlooked  should  be  the  use  of  productive  potentials 
offered by the growing elderly but healthy segments of the population. 
Yet, it must be clear that stationary state can not be dictated from above, 
created at the will of the government or anybody else. But as with many 
social constructs it can be achieved through awareness, public debates, 
appropriate  government  initiatives,  and  legislation,  all  of  which  may 
bring  us  incrementally  closer  to  its  realisation.  (For  a  more  elaborate 
discussion  of  stationary  population,  its  rationale  and  feasibility,  the 
reader is referred to my paper (Romaniuk 2009).  
Assuming  now  that  the  project  of  stationary  population  can  be 
brought  to  fruition,  the  question  arises  whether  there  is  any  optimum 
level  for  population  to  choose?  I  do  not  think  there  is  any  clear-cut 
answer to this question. The much debated optimum population theory in 
the  pre- a n d  p o s t -War  days,  though  it  might  have  been  helpful  for 
gaining insights into the complex relations between population and its 
ecological, economic and technological environments, albeit under static 
conditions only, has hardly led to any determination thereof. Nor do I 
think  its contemporary derivatives, sustainable development and alike, 
offer any answer to the question in a dynamic ever-changing world that is 
ours. We would be better off taking a pragmatic approach in this matter. 
Some countries that are already overpopulated, with high habitat density 
(England,  Benelux  countries,  Germany,  Japan,  South  Korea)  may 
actually  benefit  from  population  reduction,  namely  by  somewhat 
alleviating  the  pressure  on  space  arising  from  overcrowding  (Kono 
2009). In Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Russia, Romania, Baltic countries), 
where population has consistently plummeted to even lower levels for the 
last  15  years  or  so,  may  actually  look  forward  to  some  demographic 
recovery,  which  could  bring  these  countries  to  the  pre-decline  level. 
What is important in my view is that nations do try to stabilise population 
at around zero growth at whatever level it might be feasible. 
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We shall now turn  to our remaining question, how  to ensure a 
sustainable stationary population as a self-reproductive entity, that  is, 
how to raise fertility to the generational replacement level. 
 
 
A More Balanced Resource Allocation 
 between Production and Reproduction 
 
Traditional  family  support  programs  of  the  welfare t y p e ,  l i k e  c h i l d  
allowances, maternity leave, day care, and similar handouts delivered in 
small doses, will not do the trick. A much more radical policy approach 
is  called  for  to  maintain  fertility  at  a  level  compatible  with  the 
demographic renewal of the population, that is, about two children per 
woman. 
In order to achieve such a policy goal, we need a more balanced 
allocation  of  national  resources  between  production a n d  reproduction, 
that is, between material and immaterial resources allocated to producing 
goods and services, on the one hand, and those allocated to conceiving, 
bearing and raising children, on the other. But how can this be done? It 
is more easily said than done. There are purely technical problems and 
also issues with public perception. 
Technically,  one  can  depict  the  idea  of  balancing  off  resource 
allocations  as  a  matrix  of  relevant  variables  along  the  two  axes  — 
production a n d  reproduction —within  an  analytical framework of 
econometric type that can be operationalized to demonstrate the outcome 
under different scenarios of the trade-offs. But what specifically are these 
variables? Their identification and conceptualisation alone are difficult 
tasks. When does a reproduction variable become a production variable 
and  vice-versa?  We  may  grasp  the  matter  intuitively  and  on  a  very 
elementary  level,  but  the  matter  becomes  complex  when  one  thinks 
through the process to  the point where one can say, ‘Here,  there  is  a 
working model.’ We need to engage in simulation exercises by means of 
suitable econometric models to assess the impact of trade-offs on both 
economic and childbearing performances, and come up with some kind 
of optimisation. Such a model of optimisation between production and 
reproduction  trade-offs  is  not  a  one  individual  task.  It  requires  a 
multidisciplinary team.  
On  political  front,  one  would  need  to  overcome  the  prevailing 
public s c e p t i c i s m  t h a t  a n y t h i n g  a t  a l l  c a n  b e  d o n e  t o  a l t e r  p e o p l e s ’  
attitudes and behaviour in the matter of procreation, short of some kind 
of  legislative  imposition  from  above  of  a tw o  c hi l d re n  f am il y  p o l ic y . 
That is not for our liberal society. 
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However,  if  it  is  true  that  the  single  most  powerful  factor  that 
drives  so  many  women  into  gainful  employment,  away  from 
motherhood, is financial considerations, as I am inclined to believe, then 
wouldn’t it be right to assume that maternity disinclination can be beaten 
by the same means – through proportionate financial and family support 
incentives? I have advocated salary-equivalent, or something of that kind, 
for women who choose to pursue motherhood (fatherhood) (Romaniuc 
1998). The question as to how the principle can be applied in concrete 
situations to  make  it a workable policy would require a great deal of 
thinking and research to choose among many possible combinations. 
This  said,  no  one  should  underestimate  the  obstacles  to  even 
considering, let alone implementing, the project of a major shift in the 
allocation  of  resources  from  production  to  procreation.  Wealth  and 
growth are very human, inborn and socially cultivated virtues (although 
sometimes predicaments). Consumerism is in full swing, supported by 
advertising and the availability of credit, making consumption of superior 
goods and all new brands on the market affordable to rich and the less 
rich. To quote Galbraith, "wants are increasingly created by the process 
by which they are satisfied" (1958: 128). And there is a strong aversion 
to  any  antithesis  to  growth.  Any  impediment,  the  smallest  setback  in 
aggregate economic growth, as well as the first signs of a recession, send 
alarm  bells  across  all  spectrums  of  economic  activity,  nationally  and 
internationally. As Homer-Dixon puts it, “Our societies and economies – 
as  currently  set  up  – n e e d  c o n s t a n t  g r o w t h  t o  m a i n t a i n  s o c i a l  a n d  
economic stability” (2006: 192). 
Yet,  the  idea  of  balancing  production  imperatives  and 
reproduction  goals  to  ensure  generational  renewal  as  a  long-term 
proposition, deserves an honest consideration rather than being dismissed 
off hand as farfetched or utopian. Conceptually and technically, the task 
is  complex.  Politically,  it  might  be  a  formidable  challenge.  But  its 
implementation, once the principle is politically accepted, may be less 
daunting than it may appear at first sight. Under stationary conditions, 
the demands for children, and immigrants as well, are less than under the 
population  growth  scenario.  Moreover  we  may  not  need  to p u s h  t h e  
financial  incentives  for  maternity  to  the  point  of  competing  with 
employment  wages  to  make  the  difference.  Much  less  may  suffice  to 
induce couples to increase their family size, modestly but sufficiently to 
meet  targets  close  to  generational  replacement  levels.  Nor  does  this 
writer advocate, in his conceptualisation of the stationary population as a 
long term policy goal,a population closed to immigration — not at all. 
Transnational  flow  of  people  is  an  important  factor  of  cultural  cross-
fertilisation  among  nations  and  as  a  mechanism  to  bring  about    an 
economically more prosperous and egalitarian world society, in the long 
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run. From the point of national cohesiveness and identity, the concern is 
that of immigration size and integrability. 
So much for reproduction (i.e., procreation). As for production, 
there  is nowadays  a far  too heavy  emphasis on economic imperatives  
economic growth at any cost. Yet, this mindset too can be challenged, 
and in fact it is already being challenged in the spirit of social harmony, 
environmental  concerns  for  the  planet  health  and  creative  endeavours 
other  than  purely  material.  There  is  nothing  indeed  immutable  or 
sacrosanct  in  the  liberal  economy  that  cannot  be  challenged  to  make 
room for social concerns, including the renewal of generations, without 
falling into the trap of a centrally planned command economy. Mill’s 
(1848)  admonishing  his  fellow  country  men  over  their  uninhibited 
appetite for yet more wealth, and his call to temper the growth impulse 
by redirecting the human effort towards less materialistic, more creative 
goals,  has  gained  adepts  (Daly  and  Cobb  1989).  Community-building 
aspects of human activities is one example thereof; all-out humanitarian 
and technical assistance, the transfer of know-how to help poor countries 
overcome  poverty,  would  be  another.  Granted  these  exhortations  may 
sound idealistic, all too human, and it might be so. But who tells us the 
building-up of wealth, well-being material and immaterial, can not go on 
by virtue of the technological advances and human ingenuity in a society 
bent more on the quality than on numbers of its members? 
 
 
Concluding Comments 
 
In this essay I have laid down three major themes for demographers to 
mull over. Again, they are: (1) the new demographic age, spearheaded by 
the economically most developed nations, that humanity is entering the 
age of demographic maturity; (2) the stationary population in the long 
run as an optimum solution to many problems humanity is facing, more 
specifically in regard to the environmental health of the planet, national 
identity  and  social  cohesion;  and  (3)  the  quest  for  a  more  balanced 
allocation  of  resources  between  production  and  procreation s o  a s  t o  
achieve a self-reproductive stationary population in the long run. A great 
deal more thinking over conceptual, technical and political prerequisites 
is called for than is possible here. This paper is only a very first step in 
this direction. 
I  am  offering  one  vision,  one  policy  option,  namely  that  of  a 
stationary population. Others that may come up with different options, 
one of a growing population or, why not, one of a smaller population by 
reducing  immigration,  the  birth  rate  being  already  under  replacement 
level in many countries.  Still others may opt for a laisse] faire approach, 
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arguing that any population policy is pointless, particularly in the global 
economy, and that not only should the government keep its hands off of 
childbearing  decisions  by  individuals,  but  all  barriers  to  immigration 
should also be removed.  All options should be on the table for open 
uninhibited debate. 
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